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Section I: Introduction 
Asset bubbles have significant consequences for the economies in which they arise. 
They affect the price level, exchange rates, the real interest rate, and the growth rate, just to name 
a few economic measures. But how is one supposed to go about proving that a bubble has in fact 
occurred or that one is occurring? One thing is certain: their symptoms have extremely powerful 
and significant effects on today's global economy. In fact, while the literature concerning asset 
pricing, expectations, and consumer preferences seems vague and disconnected from the real 
economy at times, few people would make the same remark about a bank crisis-a likely result of 
an asset bubble collapse. As the behavior of money-measures such as Ml and M2 have become 
unpredictable due to innovations in banking technology, central bankers have come to rely on 
inflation targeting as a way of overseeing an economy. Inflation targeting requires central 
bankers to maintain a delicate balance; deflation could damage an economy just as much as 
could hyperinflation. Fisher(1933) demonstrates that debt-deflation may have been one of the 
main factors in prolonging the Great Depression. In addition, Bemanke (1983) shows that 
deflation was one of the main reasons that the cost of credit intermediation rose during the 
Depression, creating a credit squeeze that hurt households, farmers, and small businesses. 
Policymakers·generally aim for a slightly positive increase in the Consumer J>rice Index 
(CPI) for a number of reasons. First, most economists believe that the CPI overestimates 
inflation between 0.5% & 2%i. Second, recent studies show that nominal wages appear to be 
downwards rigid l (lMF 1999). Third, an economy with zero or near-zero inflation runs a greater 
risk of falling into a "liquidity trap,,2. Within the last twenty years, central bankers have 
succeeded in suppressing inflation as measured by the CPI. Economic communities worldwide 
i Mankiw, N., Gregory, (1997). Macroeconomics, 3rd Edition, Worth Publishers, New York, p.36. 
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are experiencing mild, single digit levels of inflation while, at the same time enjoying low levels 
of unemployment by historical standards. While central bankers have tempered the CPI, asset 
prices have risen to unprecedented heights. The most visible example is the u.s. stock market, 
where the NASDAQ appreciated 86% in the last year alone. This rise has given policymakers 
reason to reflect on the similar Japanese boom and bust cycle of the late 1980s which has 
plagued their economy with problems that remain today. 
Economists, attempting to understand how asset prices could achieve such levels, explain 
these events by using models of asset price inflation, known as "asset bubble" models. While 
not yet rigorously proven, asset bubbles have some intuitive appeal. Their general characteristics 
fit the pattern of recent events. According to historical measures of valuation, assets are 
currently overvalued. The main purpose of asset bubble models is to explain how such an 
overvaluation could occur. To rigorously prove that an asset bubble has occurred, or is 
occurring, requires the objective measurement of the "fundamental value" of an asset, an item 
that is itself inherently sUbjective.3 Therefore, the validity of any empirical tests performed on 
asset bubbles is questionable at best. 
This paper takes a different approach by developing a model based on the boom and bust 
cycle of Japan during the mid to late 1980's, using currently accepted theory. In section II, I 
review the general characteristics of asset bubbles to familiarize the reader and offer some 
historical examples. Section III offers a review of many of the theoretical papers on asset 
bubbles, as well as empirical papers, which involve similar phenomena in order to gain some 
insight in building the model. In section IV, I build a theoretical model. Section V begins 
preliminary testing to examine this theory and reviews the results. Finally, in section VI, I 
provide concluding remarks and discuss areas that I plan to explore in future research. 
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Section II : General Characteristics of Asset Bubbles and Historical Examples 
In general, there are three main phases to asset bubbles. First, there is a change in the 
economic environment. This change could be some form of financial deregulation, a 
technological innovation, or a similar event. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) note that financial 
liberalization is a significant factor in predicting the probability of banking crises. They observe 
that 18 out of 25 economies that experienced banking crises between 1970 and 1995 had 
undergone financial liberalization in the five years previous to the crisis. A rapid expansion of 
credit follows ths shift in environment, accompained by a rise in asset prices, beginning the 
inflation of the asset bubble. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) show that a reason for the rise in asset 
prices is that the external finance premium4 is reduced, which encourages businesses to invest. 
The reduction of the external finance premium also lowers investment costs for small businesses 
that might not be able to issue equity. Similarly, Mishkin (1995) points out that Tobin's q5 is 
affected. When a firm's q is high, the market value of the firm is high-relative to the replacement 
cost of capital. Therefore, the firm will issue equity to pay for new capital or projects. The rise 
of asset prices increases a firm's q, providing an incentive to raise funds through the issuing of 
equity. Bernanke et. al. (1995) also demonstrate that the rise in asset prices allows households 
and firms to borrow larger amounts due to the magnified value of the collateral included in their 
balance sheets. As asset prices climb, possibly for as long as a few years, the asset market 
becomes increasingly fragile until the occurrence of some particular event (due to the delicacy of 
the market) "pricks" the bubble, thus beginning the second phase. 
The second phase, the collapse of asset prices, begins with the event that triggers the 
collapse of the bubble. This event could be a tightening of monetary policy, market sentiment, or 
external factors. The phase is short in comparison to the first phase and may occur in as little as 
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a few days, or progress more slowly over a period of months. The collapse in asset prices 
produces effects similar to that of a period of rapid deflation. Firms or households that have 
borrowed during the first phase will find that their real burden of debt has significantly increased. 
If the deflation effect is strong enough, prices will begin to fall, causing the real interest rate to 
rise, even if the nominal interest rate remains unchanged. As noted by Reinhart and Kaminsky 
(1996), the stock market descends rapidly and bottoms out a few months after the initial collapse. 
With a fixed exchange rate, a devaluation may occur and could be accompanied by large capital 
outflows. 
The final phase, normally longer than either ofthe first two phases, involves the resulting 
financial problems of the economy. Allen and Gale (1998) characterize the third phase, 
By the default of many finns and other agents that have borrowed assets at inflated rates. Banking and/or 
foreign exchange rate crises may follow this wave of defaults. The difficulties associated with the defaults 
and banking and foreign exchange crises often cause problems in the real sector of the economy which can 
last for a number ofyears. ii 
The defaults are caused by the higher level of real debt, which many households and 
firms are unable to service. The large number of unserviceable loans returning to banks may 
disrupt the financial system in ways consistent with those which Bemanke (1983) notes during 
the Depression. He shows that this disruption could raise the cost of credit intermediation and, 
due to the risks banks perceive in lending, the disruption could also ration credit. Withholding 
loans from borrowers who have sound projects could further contract the economy, leading to 
even more defaults. An economy with previously low levels of inflation also runs the risk of a 
deflationary spiral6 due to the deflation effect. 
The oldest known & most famous example of an asset bubble is the "tulipmania" that 
ii Allen, Frank and Douglas Gale, (1998) "Bubbles and Crises," Mimeo, New York University, 
p.1. 
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occurred in the Netherlands between 1634-1637. Until 1634, the market for tulip bulbs had been 
limited to professional traders. However, in 1634 non-professionals entered the market in large 
numbers, thus changing the economic environment. As trade increased, formal futures markets7 
developed where traders would meet in various taverns called "colleges" to conduct trades and 
write contracts. Garber (1989) remarks, 
Prices of individual bulbs reached enormous levels; for example, a single Semper Augustus bulb was sold 
at the height of the speculation for 5,500 guilders, a weight of gold equal to $50,000 evaluated at $450 per 
ounceiii . 
The mania grew to such an extent that even common bulbs saw their prices sky rocket in 1636, 
which Garber concedes, "does defy explanation."iv In the first week of February 1637 the bubble 
collapsed. The cause of this collapse is unknown. Unfortunately, direct data which could be 
used to measure the economic effects caused by the collapse is not available. However, the city 
council ofHaarlem, one of the major traders in bulbs, passed a regulation permitting buyers to 
terminate a contract on payment of 3.5 percent of the contract price.8 Since this example 
involves one particular good, the chances that it created widespread financial disturbances are 
very slim. 
Another example is the South Sea bubble that occurred in London during the early 18th 
Century. During the War of the Spanish Succession, 
The British government tried several innovative ways to reduce the burden of debt, the most prominent of 
which was the swap of debt for equity .... The government benefitted by paying lower interest rates on the 
debt the company acquired, in exchange for which the company received a monopoly of trade or fmance. v 
This changed the economic environment and started phase one. There was dramatic 
iii Garber, Charles (1989). "Tulipmania," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No.3, p. 537. 
iv Garber, Charles (1989). "Tulipmania," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No.3, p.536. 
v Schubert, Eric, C., (1988). "Innovations, Debts, and Bubbles: International Integration of 
Financial Markets in Western Europe, 1688-1720," Journal of Economic History, Vol. 48, No. 2, 
p.302. 
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increase in the volume of securities being traded in 1719,which led to the rise of the South Sea 
Company stock. The British government promoted it, swapping more debt for equity. In the 
summer of 1720, with the market being extremely fragile, investors began profit taking and a the 
collapse of South Sea Company followed. Schubert notes, 
The fmancial panic after the collapse of the South Sea Bubble in England, the insurance bubbles in 
Holland, and the dissolution of Law's System in France was truly international.v; 
A more recent example that may prove to be a bubble is the Beanie Baby phenomenon, wherein 
collectors pay up to and sometimes beyond one thousand dollars for a 'rare edition Beanie Baby' . 
One must remember that at some point all of these dolls could be purchased from Hallmark 
stores for $5.95 (Hallmark has a set ceiling on the price.)9 
A trend that bubbles tend to exhibit is an investor "euphoria". Individuals believe that there has 
been a fundamental change in the economy. Agents discern from this that economic prosperity 
and continued growth will go on indefinitely. Some examples of this euphoria include a new 
book- Dow 36,000: The New Strategy for Profiting from the Coming Rise in the Stock Market, 
by James K. Glassman and Kevin A. Hasset- and the infamous quote from Irving Fisher, an 
esteemed Yale economist, on the eve of the 1929 crash, "stock prices have reached a permanent 
and high plateau." 
Section IlL 1 : Theory and Supporting Literature of Bubbles 
In this section I discuss some theoretical literature supporting asset bubbles. While the 
literature is vast and extremely technical, Camerer (1989) provides an excellent review. He 
v; 5Schubert, Eric, C. (1988). "Innovations, Debts, and Bubbles: International Integration of 
Financial Markets in Western Europe, 1688-1720," Journal o/Economic History, Vol. 48, No.2, 
p.303. 
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discusses three similar phenomena: information bubbles, fads, and growing bubbles. 
Information bubbles, 
Occur when prices depart from intrinsic values based on all available information, because information is 
not perfectly aggregated by market prices or because agents have different beliefs about how the economy 
works.vii 
In other words, this type of asset bubble may occur if agents have heterogeneous 
expectations and/or information. Stiglitz and Grossman (1980) rigorously prove that prices 
cannot fully reveal information, since this implies that agents would have no incentive to engage 
in information gathering-supporting the theory of heterogeneous information among traders. 
One way to insure that information can not be fully revealed is to introduce noise traders into the 
model. The introduction of noise traders will make it impossible for uniformed traders to 
distinguish between the noise signal and the true signal with any certainty. 
Camerer (1989) also discusses rational and "near rational" growing bubbles in detail. He 
shows that under certain conditions, asset bubbles are consistent with rational expectations. 
First, an asset bubble must grow every period at rate r in order to sustain investor participation. 
Secondly, an asset bubble cannot survive for an infinite time period. Therefore, if an asset 
bubble has a probability p of bursting, the probability of it surviving to period n is (l_p)n. As n 
gets large the probability of the bubble's survival tends toward zero. Finally, a rational growing 
bubble cannot be negative, since that would imply that at some point the asset prices would turn 
negative-which would anticipate the bubble before it begins. Tirole (1982) points out that 
heterogeneous information among traders does not affect whether or not a rational growing 
bubble exists, suggesting that information bubbles and rational bubbles can exist at the same 
vii Camerer, Colin (1989). "Bubbles and Fads in Asset Prices," Journal o/Economic Surveys, Vol. 
3, No.1 , p.l. 
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time. 
Based on the "greater fool" argument, near rational bubbles can occur if traders are not 
homogeneous and if each trader over optimistically believes that he has the ability to anticipate 
the bubble's collapse. A near rational bubble may also occur when the value of an asset is 
unknown to traders. Since agents wish to maximize their returns, they will hold the asset until 
they estimate that the bubble is near bursting. However, at that point in time, t+j, agents are 
unsure ofthe asset's value, which forces the agents to make an estimate of what the asset's value 
at t+j will be as they purchase the asset. 
Kagel and Levin (1986) explore the role of uncertainty in the formation of near rational 
bubbles by performing controlled experiments with common value auctions. They define 
"winner's curse" as the highest bidder's systematic overestimation of the item's value, resulting 
in negative profits. The highest bidder should realize that he is being "allowed" to buy the item 
due to his overestimation of the asset's value (making him the greater fool) and should thus 
revise his bid downward. However, this mistake appears difficult to correct. Kagel and Levin 
show that winner's curse is significant through 15-20 periods. 10 
When discussing fundamental values and "intrinsic" values, one must be precise, 
according to Tirole (1982). Tirole draws a distinction between a financial market fundamental 
and a real market fundamental using black schmoos (an imaginary good). His argument 
proceeds as follows: Suppose that the black schmoo is a storable good, for which the depletion 
of the market fundamental requires the destruction of the good. Assume that the black schmoo's 
dividend is zero, and that the consumption value is one. What is the market fundamental? The 
market fundamental is zero, but most people link market fundamental with consumption value. 
9 
Therefore, Tirole draws the distinction between the financial market fundamental which is zero, 
and the real market fundamental, which is one. By taking the difference between these 
fundamentals and the price, one obtains the financial bubble and the real bubble. Tirole therefore 
points out that the connection between the market price and the real market fundamental is that at 
each instant, the real market fundamental imposes a lower bound on the market price. 
Section III.3: Empirical Papers 
The following papers discuss bank crises and how specific economic variables affect the 
economies in question. 
Fisher, in his seminal paper, "The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions" suggests 
that over-investment financed by borrowing could cause serious repercussions for the economy, 
if an economic downturn is accompanied by a fall in prices. At the center of this theory is the 
idea that while prices are falling, debt in real terms is rising. 
Over-indebtedness leads to deflation; conversely, deflation caused by the debt reacts on the debt. Each 
dollar still unpaid becomes a bigger dollar, and if the over-indebtedness with which we started was great 
enough, the liquidation of debts cannot keep up with the fall in prices which it creates. In that case, the 
liquidation defeats itself. While it diminishes the number of dollars owed it may not do so as fast as it 
increases the value of each dollar owed. Then, the very effort of individuals to lessen their burden of debts 
increases it, because of the mass effect of the stampede to liquidate in swelling each dollar owed Then we 
have the great paradox which, I submit, is the chief secret of most, ifnot all, great depressions: The more 
the debtors pay, the more they owe. viii 
Bernanke and Gertler (1998) echo the idea that credit markets can have real effects on the 
economy, "Endogenous developments in credit markets work to propagate and amplify shocks to 
the macroeconomy.im At the heart of this model is the external finance premium,]] which 
emphasizes the role played by banks as financial intermediaries, since small businesses and 
viii Fisher, Irving (1933). "The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions," Econometrica, Vol. 
1, p.344. 
ix Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler (1998). "The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business 
Cycle Framework," National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 6455, p.4. 
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households do not have access to direct markets for financing of their investments. Anything 
that increases the value of the collateral in household and business balance sheets will lower the 
collateral to debt ratio, thus making it easier for firms and households to incur more debt. This 
introduces a financial fragility problem because debt is fixed in nominal terms while the value of 
the collateral may vary over time. If there is an adverse shock to the economy that lowers the 
value of collateral, house~olds and firms may find that they are unable to service their debt, 
therefore becoming insolvent, and increasing the number of non-performing loans that a bank is 
forced to write off. If enough firms and households default, the trend could trigger a banking 
CrISIS. 
Yeyati (1999) shows that a similar problem exists on an international scale because of 
implicit or explicit bailout schemes in lender economies. During periods of prosperity in 
borrowing economies, lending economy banks (henceforth LEB) will seek out investments in 
borrowing economies that have a higher yield, and therefore more risk, than is available in their 
own economies. The borrowing economy banks (henceforth BEBs) however, will have already 
captured the most attractive investments. 12 As more funds flow into the borrowing economies, 
they will be applied to less attractive investments which have a greater likelihood of failing. This 
overlending erodes the rents that BEBs had previously enjoyed, lowering their profitability and 
making them more susceptible to financial shocks. In Yeyati's model even when LEB funds are 
channeled through BEBs, the problem of overlending and fragility still arises. If the borrowing 
economy also has implicit or explicit deposit guarantees, this encourages further risk-taking by 
LEBs and increases the incentive to channel funds through BEBs. Due to the bailout scheme, 
LEBs are able to achieve higher yields and greater liquidity as depositors in BEBs without an 
11 
increase in risk. If the outlook of a given borrowing economy suddenly changes, LEBs are able 
to withdraw their funds and move them to another borrowing economy with relatively low risk. 
Countries with this underlying problem may find that when investor sentiment changes, their 
short term debt is called in rather than the conventional practice of rolling the debt over. 13 
Calvo and Reinhart (1999) show that large negative swings in capital flows can be very 
damaging to a borrowing economy. 
A sudden contraction in the current account deficit is likely to lead to a sharp decline in aggregate demand 
(the only exception being in the unlikely case in which there is an offsetting increase in GNP). The decline 
in demand, in tum, lowers the demand for tradables and nontradables. The excess supply oftradables thus 
created can be shipped abroad, but the nontradables, are, by definition, bottled up at home and, thus, its 
relative price will have to fall (resulting in a real depreciation of the currency). A prominent example is the 
real estate sector where relative prices have exhibited sharp falls in all recent crises: 
Calvo and Reinhart also note that banking crises are clustered in the post-financial 
liberalization period and that an economy can be severely damaged through effects on the 
financial sector by processes similar to those identified by Fisher (1933). 
One of the reasons why the sudden stop may lead to a contraction in output has to do with large unexpected 
swings in relative prices:i 
Since a banking crisis can have such a powerful effect on an economy, it is beneficial to 
study which variables may be early indicators of a coming crisis. Using a logit model, Hardy 
and pazarbasioglu (1998) study potential indicator variables. They find, 
Banking crisis was associated with a largely contemporaneous fall in real GDP growth; boom-bust cycles 
of inflation, credit expansion, and capital inflows; rising real interest rates and a declining incremental 
capital output-ratio; a sharp decline in the real exchange rate; and an adverse trade shock.xii 
Hardy and pazarbasioglu also note that geographic regions may also be an important factor. 
x Calvo, Guillermo, A. and Carmen Reinhart (1999). "When Capital Inflows Come to a Sudden 
Stop: Consequences and Policy Options," Working Paper, University of Marlyand ,p.3. 
xi Calvo, Guillermo, A. and Carmen Reinhart (1999). "When Capital Inflows Come to a Sudden 
Stop: Consequences and Policy Options," Working Paper, University of Marlyand ,p.8. 
xii Hardy, Daniel, C. and Ceyla pazarbasioglu (1998). "Leading Indicators of Banking Crises: 
Was Asia Different?," IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, p. 3. 
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Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) also study banking and currency crises to find potential common 
causes. They find that financial liberalization in the previous five years is significant in 
predicting whether a country will experience a banking crisis or currency crisis. 
This suggests that the twin crises may have their common origins in the deregulation of the financial 
system and the credit market booms and asset bubbles that, all too often, appear to accompany these:;;; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), Hardy and pazarbasioglu (1998), and Calvo and Reinhart 
(1999) provide some interesting leads for investigation when building the theoretical model. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) establish that financial deregulation is significant in predicting 
crises. Therefore it is important to try and explain why deregulation could lead to a crisis. Hardy 
and pazarbasioglu (1998) provide many valid preliminary variables to examine and also call 
attention to possible asymmetries by geographic region. Calvo and Reinhart (1999) show that 
investor sentiment and increased liquidity of the banking sector can have damaging effects on an 
economy. While these papers provide good leads for building the model, examining a case that 
many have come to consider an asset bubble would definitely be beneficial. 
Bayoumi (1999) provides a thorough account of a generally accepted asset bubble in 
Japan in the mid to late 1980s. He notes that during the asset price boom consumption stayed 
within a narrow margin of 57-61 %. This result is probably due to individuals' limited access to 
the stock markets and to bank loans, suggesting that the majority of the credit expansion came 
from the business sector. Business investment is the most cyclical element in demand since 
1980; using V AR14 analysis, Bayoumi finds that a 3% increase in lending results in a 1 % increase 
in output. Bayoumi also notes a significant correlation between the residuals of land prices, 
x;;; Kaminsky, Graciela, L., and Carmen M. Reinhart, (1996). "The Twin Crises: The Causes of 
Banking and Balance-of-Payment Problems," International Finance Discussion Papers, Board 
of Govenors ofthe Federal Reserve System, No. 544, p. 7. 
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... 
stock prices, and bank lending, concluding that asset prices affect output mainly through 
financial intermediation. 
As Kwon (1998) notes, a large fraction of business investment is financed by 
intermediated loans that require collateral. 45% of these secured loans are backed by real estate 
compared to the 3% backed by stocks and bonds. During the mid 1980s, Japan eased monetary 
policy, in accordance with the G-7, in an attempt to prevent further appreciation of the yen. 
Following this policy, the Bank of Japan increased monetary growth, which created low interest 
rates and eased credit conditions. This encouraged more bank lemling. In late 1989, when the 
Bank of Japan decided to tighten monetary policy, the asset bubble collapsed. Using V AR 
analysis, Kwon concludes that monetary policy shocks are a significant source of output 
fluctuations. 
In this section I have reviewed both theoretical and empirical literature which examines 
various aspects of asset bubbles. The theoretical literature has dealt with the structural elements 
of asset bubbles, while the empirical literature has considered promising variables and studies. I 
have tried to show that asset bubbles can have a significant impact on an economy, and that 
banking crises bare a resemblance to asset bubbles. 
Section IV: The Model 
In this section I build a theoretical model based on existing theory to explain the boom-
bust cycle of Japan in the mid to late 1980s. I believe this model explains the events in Japan 
better than using an asset bubble approach. Although the information required for this model is 
difficult to find, the model is itself empirically testable whereas asset bubbles, while being 
theoretically attractive, are impossible to test objectively with the currently available data. Also, 
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because this model uses generally accepted theory, it does not require any special conditions to 
function. 15 The model does not rule out the possibility of asset bubbles. occurring during the 
same period, implying that it may be possible for the model and bubbles to coexist. There are 
also several disadvantages to this model. First, it does not provide any easy-to-measure variables 
that can be used as warning flags for a future crisis. Second, because this model is based on the 
Japanese crisis, it may not function correctly for other economies because of the significant 
differences in Japan's business practices. Therefore, to the test the applicability of the model, I 
have also compiled data on a number of other countries as well, and will apply the preliminary 
tests to these countries as also. 
The model contains four agents; entrepreneurs (which can also be thought of as companies), 
investors, banks, and regulators. Entrepreneurs wish to maximize their profits. Profit 
maximization is achieved by making decisions in one of two mutually exclusive16 environments. 
In the first environment, where there are no 100pholesl7 , entrepreneurs engage in normal business 
practices which yield a profit of 7tj • 7tj has a normal distribution]8 with mean, 7t], and variance, 
cr/, such that 0 <cr/ < 00. In the second environment, which contains loopholes, the entrepreneur 
may now choose either to engage in normal business practices, which yields a profit of 7t j , with 
mean, 7t], and variance, O<cr 12< 00, or to engage in loophole mining, which yields a profit of 7tj . 7tj 
also has a normal distribution with mean, 7t2, and variance, O<cr2
2
< 00. The assumption of 
O<cr j
2
< 00 allows one to say that 7tj and 7tj converge in the limit to 7t1 and 7t2, respectively because 
of the Central Limit Theorem19 of probability. Since we have assumed that entrepreneurs are 
profit maximizing, two possible events can occur. If 7t] 2': 7t2 then entrepreneurs will have no 
incentive to loophole mine.20 On the other hand, if 7t]< 7t2 then entrepreneurs will engage in 
15 
loophole mining in search of a greater profit. Therefore, the entrepreneur's decision function in 
the second environment will look like 
(a) <D(7t) = {max ~)' ~2}' where 7t) and 7t2 are produced by ~)(do not loophole mine), ~2(loophole 
mine) respectively. This assumption of maximization is reasonable assuming rationality. We 
can modify the above equation to incorporate expectations if we wish, by having entrepreneurs 
choosing the action which yields the highest expected profit. The above function would then 
look like 
This does not significantly change the values, since we have assumed that 0 < (Jj2< 00 which in 
the limit provides E(~\) = 7t\ and E(~2) = 7t2. It does, however, incorporate some flexibility into 
the model, by allowing some uncertainty and the possibility that entrepreneurs could make a 
mistake in their decision. A simple example of this would be where E( ~\) > E( ~2)' but 7t2 > 7t\ . 
This use of expectations is one of the major differences between this model and an asset 
bubble model. The above function, M, is the only function which involves expectations. As the 
reader is aware from the theoretical literature review, asset bubbles use discounted future 
expectations to achieve a measure of an asset's "fundamental value." This is uses the expected 
value function as an interval variable, meaning that the numbers used and the values produced 
are important. This model uses an ordinal function of expectations, which means that the only 
important information the agent needs is that Bj > Bj or vice versa, in other words, the specific 
values do not matter. This helps to take out a lot of subjectivity in measuring expectations2\, 
which unfortunately has been one of asset bubble theory's main problems. 
The second set of agents in this model is investors. Investors are looking to get the 
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highest return for their investments over the short term.22 Unfortunately, investors are not very 
knowledgeable about how to invest their funds properly. Since, they can not accurately predict 
market movement, they watch the entrepreneurs for clues. Therefore their function might look 
something like, 
(c) It = Et_1 + T, where It is investment at time t, Et_1 are business investment decisions by 
entrepreneurs at time t-1, where the difference between t and t-1 is small, and T is a white noise 
disturbance term with mean 0 and <l> = 1. This says that an investor's decision is similar to a 
entrepreneur's decision in the previous period, where the previous period is a small difference 
away.23 For instance, if the investors saw the entrepreneurs buying large amounts of gold, they 
would then buy some for themselves in the hopes of being able to sell it later at a profit. The 
primary purpose of the investor is therefore to separate out the reasons for buying an asset that 
can be used as collateral. Investors buy the asset in the hopes of later selling it for a profit. 
Entrepreneurs buy the asset to magnify profits buy using it as collateral. The secondary purpose 
of the investors is to magnify market decisions.24 
The third set of agents in the model is banks. Banks also wish to maximize profits. In 
order to do this, banks make loans to entrepreneurs25 at the interest rate which gives the highest 
profit while minimizing the chance of default. In order to reduce the adverse selection problem26 
that exists in the loan market, banks use collateral as an insurance against possible default by 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, an entrepreneur who is holding collateral that has a high value is 
considered a safer investment than an entrepreneur who is holding collateral with a lower value, 
ceteris paribus. This is to say, a secured loan is considered a safer loan than a loan which is not, 
ceteris paribus. Besides the value of collateral held by the entrepreneur, banks also take the 
17 
history of the individual entrepreneur into consideration when making a loan. Therefore, when 
an entrepreneur first approaches a bank for a loan having no prior history with that bank, the 
bank may require a higher amount of collateral before agreeing to the loan. As the individual 
entrepreneur develops a "good track record", banks may lower their collateral requirements for 
future loans. The banks' profit function might look like, 
(d) Bb = j(r, P(default)), where r is the nominal interest rate, P(default) is minimized by a 
function g(lh' ce), where lh = the individual entrepreneur's loan history, Ce = the val~e of assets that 
the entrepreneur has available to use as collateral. 
The fourth set of agents in the market is government regulators. The regulator's job is to 
enforce the laws and practices as set forth by the government monitoring bodies. Their goal is to 
prevent an abuse ofthe regulations from damaging the economy, whether this abuse is legal ( a 
loophole) or not. In the case of a loophole, where the abuse is legal, regulators try to discover the 
loophole and close it as quickly as possible. In an environment where no loopholes exist, 
regulators have learned how to efficiently enforce the new policies, and have closed all loopholes 
that may have been created when the regulations changed. In an environment where loopholes 
exist, regulators are searching for the loopholes and attempting to close the loopholes created by 
the changes in legislation.27 While a regulator'S function might be able to be expressed in terms 
of utility. That is, a regulator attains a certain level of happiness by finding a loophole, the 
function itself would have little meaning in this context, which is why I have chosen to exclude 
it. However, it seems reasonable to assume that since a regulator is motivated by keeping his 
job, which in part at least depends upon successful completion of monitoring, we can assume that 
if a regulator has not found a loophole in a given time period, he will continue to look. Since, the 
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regulator has a wide area to cover in his search, it may be reasonable to assume that the 
probability of finding a loophole in the first time period is independent of finding the loophole in 
subsequent time periods. Therefore the probability of not finding a loophole, (l-p), in n time 
periods is (l-p)". This states that the chance of a loophole persisting in the market tends to zero, 
because there are regulators actively looking to close the 100phole.28 
Loopholes exist in an enviropment where; regulators have not yet efficiently learned to 
enforce new regulations, have not discovered the loopholes created by the change in regulations, 
or regulators have been unwilling or unable to close loopholes. One feature of loopholes is that 
finding a loophole is time consuming. This is true for both the regulators and the entrepreneurs, 
but the amount of time per group is different. In this model I assume that it takes a set time, k, 
for entrepreneurs to find a 100phole,29 whereas the time for regulators, I, to defuse a loophole 
varies.30 
Having defined the four agents of the model, I now examine the model in action. We 
begin with an economy before a change in regulation. This economy currently has no loopholes, 
therefore entrepreneurs execute decisions that will bring a stochastic profit centered around 
mean,7t\. At some point in time, (=0, there is a change in the regulation structure. The reasons 
for the change are unimportant as long as the change affects the regulation structure (this change 
can be broadly defined to include technological innovations). Entrepreneurs realize a change has 
occurred in the structure and begin searching for loopholes. At the same time, regulators begin 
searching as well and learning how to enforce the new policies. It is relatively obvious that there 
are two possible mutually exclusive events. The first event is if k ;;:: l. If this is true, then 
regulators are aBle to find the loophole and close it before or at the same time that entrepreneurs 
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find the loophole. When this event occurs there are no economic effects on the economy because 
of the loophole, since entrepreneurs do not have the opportunity to exploit it. The second, more 
interesting, event occurs when I > k. When this occurs entrepreneurs are able to exploit the 
loophole for the amount of time, l-k. Clearly, the longer this time is, the greater the impact of the 
entrepreneur's actions. Entrepreneurs, realizing that the time until the loophole is closed is 
limited, take out loans from banks to magnify their profits. Banks, seeing an increase in demand 
will ask for a higher level of capital in as an insurance measure and to "weed out" bad risks. 
Entrepreneurs will therefore purchase assets that can be held against their loans. The increase in 
demand for assets will push the price of these assets higher. Investors watching the actions of the 
entrepreneurs will buy collateralizable assets in hopes of selling them later at a profit. This will 
boost the balance sheets of entrepreneurs who were able to buy these assets before the investors' 
purchases, allowing them to increase the size of their loans without having to buy more 
collateral.3! If the loophole has not been closed by the next period, entrepreneurs will collect 1t2, 
and begin the process over again, purchasing more collateralizable assets, taking out more loans, 
and collecting 1t2 again, if the loophole survives to t = 2, and so on. 
This process can end in a number of ways. First, regulators could succeed in closing the 
loophole. If this occurs then entrepreneurs will not earn 1t2 during the final period and this could 
set off a wave defaults by entrepreneurs who were counting on 1t2 in order to make debt 
payments. Thia could then trigger a massive selling of assets by entrepreneurs in an effort to 
payoff their loans. Investors, following suit, would cause a massive price fall in these assets. As 
the price of assets fall, a wave of bad loans would have to be written offby banks, effectively 
shrinking the financial market and, if severe enough, causing nominal prices to fall, raising the 
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real bUrden of debt. The ensuing effects would be similar to those discussed elsewhere in this 
paper. Another way for the loophole to end would be if there was a shortage of attractive 
projects for entrepreneurs to invest in. This scenario would cause entrepreneurs to begin funding 
more risky project as l-k continued, in an effort to continue the previously high profits. As these 
projects begin to default, more and more bad loans come into banks, eventually pulling down the 
banking sector in ways similar to what Yeyati (1999) and Bemanke et al. (1998) describe. 
Lastly, this boom could end because asset prices rise to such a level that investors fall prey to 
animal spirits, due to the prices being historically high.32 Investors scared by pessimistic 
outlooks on their assets, would begin to sell their assets, causing the prices to fall and creating a 
self fulfilling prophesy. 
Section V: Preliminary Tests and Results 
In this section I discuss preliminary tests for the model defined in the previous section. 
When testing a model in economics, it has become standard practice to define an equation or set 
of equations based on economic theory that state relationships between one or more explanatory 
variables and one or more response variables. The researcher then uses Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) to test the validity of the equations. However, using OLS implies that all of the Gauss-
Markov assumptions are satisfied, which may not necessarily be true. In the ideal scenario, to 
test the previous model, I would draw the equations directly out of section IV and test them using 
OLS. However, as one may have noticed, some domains in section IV involve functions; 
creating extremely complicated sample spaces with mathematical properties that may not be 
obvious, let alone allow one to prove the model's validity33. Equation (c) of Section IV however, 
can be directly tested using techinques for nonstationarity data. I test this equation by evaluating 





liberalization34, during the 1980-1995 sample period that later experienced bank crises. Since I 
assume that the distance between t and t-1 is "small", I use monthly sample data, the smallest 
interval available from the IFS statistics. In order to test whether the variables are stationary or 
not I use three tests, a correlogram, Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test, and an Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test. The results are listed in tables 1.1-3. Upon findingnonstationary 
variables, I test for cointegration of the variables. The results are listed in Table 1.4. What 
follows is a discussion of the testing theory and method~. Unfortunately, one cannot use OLS 
with respect to the variables in equation (c) because the Gauss-Markov assumption of stationarity 
is violated. A variable is said to be stationary when it is defined as having the same mean 
variance, and covariance for all values.35 When confronted with nonstationarity, researchers have 
occasionally differenced the nonstationary variable until the series becomes stationary.36 Using 
the differenced series, along with the remaining variables, the researcher then runs the OLS 
regression to test the theory. This solution is not a cure-all, because whereas economic theory 
may have specified the interaction of the original variables, it may have nothing to say of the new 
equation containing the differenced variable. Therefore, to preserve the relationship between 
variables, another approach is necessary. An appropriate method would be to take the 
characteristic differences of nonstationary and stationary variables into consideration. Whereas 
the variance of a stationary variable is finite, the variance of a nonstationary variable tends to 
infinity as time increases. To prove this, assume that the variable YI is nonstationary. Then, 
assuming ~ has constant variance Yt , can be rewritten as/
7 
(1) Y, = Y'-J + ~ = (Yt-2 + ~-I) + ~ = (Yt-3 + ~-2) + ~-I + ~ = ~ + ~-I + ~-2 + ~-3 + ... + U J 
and therefore the variance of Y, is shown to tend infinity as t increases. Stationary variables also 
have constant means, whereas nonstationary variable's means change over time. Both of these 
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characteristics of non stationary variables are observed in a nonstationary variable's tendency to 
"wander", whereas a stationary variable will "stay put" around some number. A cointegration 
test looks for relationships between nonstationary variables. When nonstationary variables are 
said to be cointegrated, there is a linear combination of these variables that is itself stationary. 
Formally, say there is a set of variables, XI' X2, ••• , YI, that is I(d). If there is a linear 
combination of these variables, such that, 
(2) ~ = YII - PIXII - P2X2t - ... -PitXit' is I(d-1) 
then these variables are cointegrated. A humurous illustration of cointegration is provided by 
Murray (1994). Murray tells the story of two random walks that are cointegrated, the patterns of 
a drunk's walk, and her dog's walk. Viewed separately, the two random walks seem to wander 
aimlessly. Occasionally however, the drunk calls to her dog and the dog wanders a little closer 
to the drunk. The act of calling by the drunk can be thought of as a function which diminishes 
the distance between the two random walks whenever they separate too much. Generalizing this 
example to more than two variables, a vector of non stationary variables can be thought of as 
co integrated if they tend to move together, or there is a function, known as an error correction 
model, which keeps the variables from wandering too far apart. In order to show that a vector of 
variables are cointegrated one must first show that the individual vectors are nonstationary and of 
the same order of integration. If one has two variables which are of the same order then one can 
test In this paper I perform three tests, I construct a correlogram, I use a Durbin-Watson test, and 
an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to show nonstationarity of each of the variables. Having 
narrowed the variables to which pairs maybe cointegrated, I then test for cointegration. The 
results are provided in Table 1.4. 
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Section VII: Concluding Remarks and Plans for Further Research 
In this paper I built a model based on existing theory and the boom-bust cycle in Japan 
during the mid-late 1980s. I also reviewed theoretical and empirical papers of asset bubble 
theory to highlight the differences between the model I constructed and exist theory. While some 
of the results in table 1.4 lend support to the theory modeled here, others clearly indicate that the 
model needs to be adjusted. As one might have suspect, this paper is part of a much larger body 
of research that is still continuing. In future research I plan to explore the properties of equations 
(a), (b), and (d), and also construct a probability model using U.S. data to test the theory that as 
collateral asset prices rise, the probability of a bank being able to reclaim that collateral value 
shrinks. I will then apply this model to Japanese data, to see if this information could have been 




Test for Nonstationarity: 
Country,Variable: 
Chile, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Chile, Claims on Private Sector 
Colombia, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Colombia, Claims on Private Sector 
Guyana, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Guyana, Claims on Private Sector 
Japan, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Japan, Claims on Private Sector 
Jordan, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Jordan, Claims on Private Sector 
Kenya, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Kenya, Claims on Private Sector 
Mexico, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Mexico, Claims on Private Sector 
Norway, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Norway, Claims on Private Sector 
Paraguay, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Paraguay, Claims on Private Sector 
Portugal, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Portugal, Claims on Private Sector 
Sri Lanka, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Sri Lanka, Claims on Private Sector 
Turkey, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Turkey, Claims on Private Sector 
Uruguay, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Uruguay, Claims on Private Sector 
Venezeula, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Venezeula, Claims on Private Sector 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Test for Nonstationarity: 
Country ,Variable: 
Colombia, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Norway, Claims on Private Sector 
All variables are logged. 
Table 1.2 
Correlogram 
Test for Nonstationarity: 
Chile, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Chile, Claims on Private Sector 
1 % Critical Value: -3.5 
Level First Difference 5% Critical Value: -2.892 
Test Statistic: Test Statistic: Order of Integration 
-1.777036 -6.76883 1(1) 
-3.147587 -3.960839 1(1) 
-1.004847 -2.382722 1(2) 
0.371585 -3.775997 1(1) 
-1.899852 -6.031512 1(1) 
1.536369 -4.886519 1(1) 
-4.612473 N/A 1(0) 
-2.775361 -4.933597 l(l) 
-2.510939 -8.137924 1(1) 
-2.022278 -5.801993 1(1) 
-1.636212 -5.865647 1(1) 
1.415757 -6.076972 l(l) 
-3.157127 -4.29345 1(1) 
-0.509905 -3.934924 1(1) 
-2.316712 -5.657774 1(1) 
-2.227639 -3.249822 1(2) 
-1.096906 -5.081186 1(1) 
1.846023 -5.947566 1(1) 
-2.528681 -5.473125 1(1) 
-1.418389 -5.861571 1(1) 
-1.03368 -5.990646 l(l) 
-3.493516 -8.542258 1(0) 
0.099549 -5.399265 1(1) 
0.348089 -4.754103 1(1) 
-2.377627 -6.159615 1(1) 
0.260821 -6.89799 1(1) 
-0.368645 -4.816383 1(1) 
2.163331 -6.23981 1(1) 
1 % Critical Value: -3.5 
Second Difference 5% Critical Value: -2.892 
Test Statistic: 
-5.256886 . As Above 
-8.722564 As Above 
Highest Significant Lag 
Level First Difference Second Difference 
27 0 2 
25 0 0 
25 
Colombia, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Colombia, Claims on Private Sector 
Guyana, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Guyana, Claims on Private Sector 
Japan, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Japan, Claims on Private Sector 
Jordan, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Jordan, Claims on Private Sector 
Kenya, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Kenya, Claims on Private Sector 
Mexico, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Mexico, Claims on Private Sector 
Norway, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Norway, Claims on Private Sector 
Paraguay, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Paraguay, Claims on Private Sector 
Portugal, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Portugal, Claims on Private Sector 
Sri Lanka, Claims on Non. Fin . .Pub. Enterprises 
Sri Lanka, Claims on Private Sector 
Turkey, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Turkey, Claims on Private Sector 















































Uruguay, Claims on Private Sector 25 0 
Venezeula, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 28 0 
Venezeula, Claims on Private Sector 31 0 
A significant lag is defined as a lag with autocorrelation greater than 10.51 . 
Table 1.3 
Phillips-Perron 
Test for Nonstationarity: 
Country, Variable: 
Chile, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Chile, Claims on Private Sector 
Colombia, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Colombia, Claims on Private Sector 
Guyana, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Guyana, Claims on Private Sector 
Japan, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Japan, Claims on Private Sector 
Jordan, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Jordan, Claims on Private Sector 
Kenya, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Kenya, Claims on Private Sector 
Mexico, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises 
Mexico, Claims on Private Sector 



















































1 % Critical Value: -3.47 
5% Critical Value: -2.88 
















Norway, Claims on Private Sector -3.695014 N/A 1(0) 
Paraguay, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises -2.178557 -14.5448 1(1) 
Paraguay, Claims on Private Sector 1.863157 -10.7148 1(1) 
Portugal, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises -2.974655 -13.24584 1(1) 
Portugal, Claims on Private Sector -1.672946 -14.30829 1(1) 
Sri Lanka, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises -1.286379 -15,89067 1(1) 
Sri Lanka, Claims on Private Sector -6.487919 N/A 1(0) 
Turkey, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises -0.268212 -16.8786 1(1) 
Turkey, Claims on Private Sector 0.100844 -13.65666 1(1) 
Uruguay, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises -2.1587 -13.27233 1(1) 
Uruguay, Claims on Private Sector 1.046951 -13.61167 1(1) 
Venezeula, Claims on Non. Fin. Pub. Enterprises -0.337625 -13.43433 1(1) 
Venezeula, Claims on Private Sector 1.388602 -9.76113 1(1) 
All variables are logged. 
Table 1.4 
All variables are logged. The first three letters of each variable after "log" are the first three 
letters of each country's name. "CPS" stands for claims on the private sector. This is the variable 
I use as a proxy for the investor. "CPNE" stands for claims on nonfinancial public enterprises, 
this is the proxy for entrepreneurs. The table first table is the nonstationary OLS regression. The 
second table is the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for nonstationarity. If the statistic is greater 
(in absolute value) than the indicated critical value, the series is nonstationary and hence CPS 
and CPNE are cointegrated. 
I.4A- Colombia 
Dependent Variable: LOGCOLCPS 
Included observations: 90 
Excluded observations: 87 after adjusting endpoints 






ADF Test Statistic 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
5.648073 0.199982 28.24292 
-0.845521 0.559019 -1.512509 
1.357792 0.557913 2.433698 
0.420576 Durbin-Watson stat 
0.407256 
1.296341 1% Critical Value* 
0.463341 5% Critical Value 










Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
COLOMBIARESID(-1) 0.043915 0.033876 1.296341 0.1991 
D(COLOMBIARESID(-1)) -0.859267 0.122451 -7.017235 0 
D(COLOMBIARESID(-2)) -0.289873 0.117584 -2.465238 0.0161 
C 0.045501 0.033823 1.345244 0.1829 
1.4 B-Guyana 
Dependent Variable: LOGGUYCPS 
Included observations: 184 after adjusting endpOints 
Variable Coefficien Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
t 
















0.354064 2.07521 0.0394 
0.350879 2.926497 0.0039 
0.742248 Durbin-Watson stat 
0.739399 
0.063743 
-1.438983 1% Critical Value* -3.4676 
. 0.299053 5% Critical Value -2.8775 
0.287172 10% Critical Value -2.5752 






0.016697 -1.438983 0.1519 
0.069801 8.432134 0 
0.07185 -4.891483 o 
0.011547 0.372539 0.7099 
Dependent Variable: LOGJORCPS 
Included observations: 181 after adjusting endpOints 











D( JORDAN RESI D( -1)) 
t 
3.26623 0.138204 23.63335 0 
0.343776 0.086943 3.954022 0.0001 
0.410029 0.085775 4.780313 0 
0.819713 Durbin-Watson stat 0.161119 
0.817687 
-1.76128 1% Critical Value* -3.4682 
0.2034 5% Critical Value -2.8777 
0.189665 10% Critical Value -2.5753 




0.028829 -1.76128 0.0799 







0.070099 -5.595581 0 
0.005238 0.232372 0.8165 
Dependent Variable: KENCPS 
Included observations: 178 after adjusting endpoints 














1.4 E- Paraguay 
t 
6652.502 1521 .167 4.373288 0 
6.081155 2.859823 2.126409 0.0349 
4.141952 2.891856 1.432282 0.1538 
0.641084 Durbin-Watson stat 0.038673 
0.636982 
-1.889751 1% Critical Value* -3.4688 
0.235867 5% Critical Value -2.878 
0.222461 10% Critical Value -2.5755 






0.013806 -1 . ~89751 0.0605 
0.076977 6.678868 0 
0.079005 -0.456604 0.6485 
141 .3323 0.242079 0.809 
Dependent Variable: LOGPARCPS 
Included observations: 177 
Excluded observations: 1 after adjusting endpoints 













D(PARAGUAYRESI D( -4» 
t 
2.769963 0.091001 30.43882 o 
-0.36675 0.439525 -0.834423 0.4052 
1.148023 0.436357 2.630927 0.0093 
0.8823 Durbin-Watson stat 0.049708 
0.880947 
-5.411577 1% Critical Value* -3.4713 
0.466449 5% Critical Value -2.8791 
0.449564 10% Critical Value -2.576 
-0.976359 0.18042 -5.411577 0 
-0.008057 0.162402 -0.04961 0.9605 
0.006772 0.143865 0.047073 0.9625 
0.020455 0.119194 0.17161 0.864 
0.021778 0.08547 0.254802 0.7992 
29 
C 0.8031 36 75.62502 0.01062 0.9915 
1.4 F -Turkey 
Dependent Variable: LOGTURCPS 
Included observations: 106 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficien Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
t 












D(TURKEYRESI D( -3» 
D(TURKEYRESID(-4» 
C 
0.521111 0.118459 4.399092 0 
0.486164 0.118516 4.102078 0.0001 
0.983126 Durbin-Watson stat 0.26906 
0.982799 
-2.494927 1% Critical Value* -3.4959 
0.178695 5% Critical Value -2.89 
0.135468 10% Critical Value -2.5818 








0.0551 17 -2.494927 0.0143 
0.100155 2.822621 0.0058 
0.10387 -2.268916 0.0255 
0.097943 1.842738 0.0685 
0.098668 -1.009595 0.3153 
0.008039 -0.468187 0.6407 
Dependent Variable: LOGURUCPS 
Included observations: 144 after. adjusting endpoints 
















2.342598 0.065076 35.99768 0 
0.222293 0.199814 1.112503 0.2678 
0.630954 0.198487 3.17882 0.0018 
0.97836 Durbin-Watson stat 0.098749 
0.978053 
-6.310291 1% Critical Value* -3.4701 
0.486937 5% Critical Value -2.8786 
0.471199 10% Critical Value -2.5758 








0.179762 -6.310291 0 
0.159923 0.772445 0.441 
0.140833 1.081099 0.2812 
0.116885 1.212433 0.2271 
0.083227 1.200606 0.2316 
C -3.899571 73.3672 -0.053151 0.9577 
l .4G-Venezuela 
Dependent Variable: LOGVENCPS 
Included observations: 181 after adjusting endpOints 
Variable Coefficien Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
t 
C 4.682699 0.035645 131 .3698 0 
LOGVENCPNE 0.221235 0.088208 2.508097 0.013 
LOGVENCPNE(-1) 0.285766 0.089422 3.195692 0.0017 
R-squared 0.830567 Durbin-Watson stat 0.102567 
Adjusted R-squared 0.828663 
ADF Test Statistic -3.337497 1 % Critical Value* -3.4686 
R-squared 0.356163 5% Critical Value -2.8779 
Adjusted R-squared 0.337227 10% Critical Value -2.5754 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
VENEZUELARESID(-1) -0.075046 0.022486 -3.337497 0.001 
D(VENEZUELARESID(-1)) 0.692533 0.075623 9.157697 0 
D(VENEZUELARESI D( -2)) -0.427138 0.095244 -4.484669 0 
D(VENEZUELARESID(-3)) 0.272063 0.104627 2.600303 0.0101 
D(VENEZUELARESID(-4)) 0.008236 0.096215 0.085602 0.9319 
C 0.000841 0.007515 0.111867 0.9111 
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I With Downwards rigid nominal wages and zero inflation, permanent disequilibriums could 
occur in the labor market, since workers and laborers are unwilling to cut wages in nominal 
terms. With slightly positive inflation, a real reduction in paid wages could occur by not 
increasing nominal wages as rapidly as inflation. 
2 A liquidity trap occurs when an economy is unable to lower interest rates any further because of 
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. This reduces the effectiveness of the interest rate 
transmission mechanism. Since interest rates are one of the primary tools of monetary policy, 
jump-starting a stalling economy without them can be extremely difficult; as shown by the recent 
efforts in Japan. 
3 An asset's fundamental value can be thought of as the discounted value of a future stream of 
payments. For example, discounted dividend stream for a stock is simply the expected value of 
future portions of the company's profits discounted at a rate of interest. 
4 The external finance premium is defined as the difference between the cost of funding 
investments externally, issuing equity or debt, and funding investments internally, using retained 
eammgs. 
5 Tobin's q IS defined as the market value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital. 
6 A deflationary spiral occurs when, as prices begin to fall, consumers withhold purchasing goods 
because they expect to see prices fall farther, creating a cycle that feeds itself and could contract 
the economy even further. 
7 Garber (1989) notes that due to the growth process of tulips, contracts were written up for 
exchange and payment at some future date. This created a forward futures market, not unlike our 
current futures market for oranges, or pork bellies. 
8 This information is summarized from Garber (1989). 
9 In-fact, there have been cases where certain beanie babies-for instance, the Princess Di beanie 
baby sold at two different prices at the same time. The Princess Di beanie baby was at one point 
selling "on the streets" for just over $100 dollars, while Hallmark was selling them for $5.95. 
The occurance of two different prices with such disparity is my main reason for this being a near 
rational bubble. 
10 These results cannot be attributed to inexperience, since all participants had previously 
participated in similar studies. 
II The external finance premium is defined as the difference between the cost of funding 
investments externally, issuing equity or debt, and funding investments internally, using retained 
eammgs. 
12 This assumption is not required, since if LEBs capture the highest yielding investments, then 
BEBs will be only be able to secure less attractive investments. This increases the financial 
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fragility of the economy. 
13This is one of the factors that led to the Russian economic collapse in August of 1998. 
14 "V AR" is vector autoregression estimation. Its name comes from the fact that it allows lagged 
values of the dependent variable as explanatory variables. V ector comes from the use of two or 
more variables. It is in essence a multivariable version of ARIMA models. For a detailed 
discussion see, Gujarati (1995) pp. 746-750. 
15 The reader can easily see this advantage when contrasted with growing bubbles, near rational 
bubbles, or rational bubbles. 
16 Showing that these environments are mutually exclusive is a trivial matter. Assume that event 
A, is the event that there are loopholes in the regulation structure and event B is the event that 
there are no loopholes in the regulation structure. A and B are said to be mutually exclusive if, 
AOB = 0 Notice that A= 1-B= AC• aEAc if aEA~ a~B therefore this implies there does not 
exist an a such that a E A /\ a EEB. Therefore A 0 B = 0. By a similar argument we can also 
show that A i B = L, where L is the entire sample space. 
17 A loophole in this model is defined as a gap in regulations, lack of efficient supervision, or a 
technicality, that allows entrepreneurs to seek high~rprofits than would normally be achievable, 
possibly to the detriment of other agents in the economy. 
18 This assumption of normality is justified by the large number of entrepreneurs the are in the 
market, and by the fact that profits, for all practical purposes, can be considered continuous. 
19 For details on the Central Limit Theorem see Durret (1994). 
20 Here I assume that ifB]=B2' then entrepreneurs will not switch to loophole mining. This 
assumption can be justified by including costs in switching to loophole mining. I exclude the 
costs for simplicity of the model. One interesting exception however, where entrepreneurs will 
be willing to switch even though 7t] = 7t2, is when cr/ < cr /. In this case, one could think of the 
stochastic profit of 7tj as more "certain" than 7ti since the range that 7tj will fall in will be more 
tightly clustered around 7t2, than 7ti around 7t], certeris paribus. 
21 For instance, one might agree with me that if the Federal Reserve in March decided to raise 
interest rates by a full point this would hurt the financial standing of a company like General 
Electric. However, we might disagree over the exact dollar value effect this would have on GE. 
This demonstrates the difference between an ordinal (bad for GE) use of expectations and an 
interval (GE will be affected by $15,789,455.05) use of expectations. 
22 One might argue that investors are looking for the greatest possible return overall, whether that 
be from executing decisions in the short run or the long run. One must keep in mind almost all 
ofthe forecast data provided (including investment ratings) are provided for the short term (0-2 
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years max) and that the largest investors in the market are not small time traders, but pension 
funds. However, this is a simplistic model so one must excuse some "hand waving". 
23 Small contains some ambiguity. While I agree with Stiglitz et al. (1980) that it is impossible 
for markets to perfectly convery information, t must be chosen sufficiently small that investors 
are able to profit from witnessing the business decisions of entrepreneurs. The market clearly 
provides incentives, namely higher profits, to those who are able to obtain information quickly, 
therefore t must be close to zero. 
24 This means that investors can be a source of exogenous shocks, such as animal spirits. Also 
when entrepreneurs begin defaulting on their loans, investors take this as a sign to sell their 
assets, since the entrepreneur is no longer making a profit. This helps fuel the collapse of asset 
prices. The investor could further magnify market decisions if banks are allowed to loan to the 
investor, but for simplicity I will leave this possibility out. 
25 This assumption implies that entrepreneurs do not have direct access to capital markets, while 
this assumption is less plausable for some economies than for Japan, it is by no means a realistic 
assumption, and is made for the purpose of keeping the model simple. 
26 For details concerning adverse selction see Akerlof (1970). 
27 Closing a loophole can be accomplished in a number of different ways. Closing the loophole 
may be as simple as learning how to efficiently monitor new regulations. This may hold true 
especially for developing economies where regulators may be inexperienced in supervising 
financial institutions, being that the institutions are relatively new. 
28 This should look familiar from the earlier discussion of asset bubbles. 
29 The following narrative supports this assumption. After every change in the regulations, each 
entrepreneur examines for a loophole to exploit relative to his business. If we hold each 
entrepreneur's position constant, and fluctuate the size of the regulation change, we see that he 
still must evaluate these changes relative to his position. Therefore, for each entrepreneur there 
is a fixed time, k, to evaluate the regulations in search of a exploitable loophole. 
30 A similar argument to 24 can be used here. After every change, egulators must learn how to 
efficiently enforce the new regulations, while at the same time trying to close any loopholes that 
might have arisen from the changes. The time to become efficient in enforcing the regulations 
will depend on the size of the change. For example, one can imagine that regulators would have 
had a lot of learning to do after the introduction of the Glass-Stegal act, compared to the 
abolishment of Regulation Q. 
31 I will argue in later paper that this could be a source of risk to the market. 
32 For example, who really believes that a share Yahoo.com is worth $400? 
33 So far preliminary "glances" into what the sample spaces of these functions may look like has 
been encouraging, however proving the validity of these functions is certainly beyond the 
mathematical level of an undergraduate research paper. 
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34 Originally, Demirg8c-Kunt et al. (1998) tested fifty-three countries. Out of these fifty-three, 
twenty-five had experienced banking crises during the 1980-1995 period after financial 
liberalization. Eleven of these countries were eliminated from the sample for missing data. All 
data is drawn from the International Financial Statistics CD-Rom. 
35 This is actually the assumption of "weak" or second order stationarity. Formally, a series is 
said to be stationary if the probability distribution remains constant over time, or: 
P(Xtl, ..... ,Xm)= P(Xtl+j, ..... ,Xm+j) for all i. 
36 A series that becomes stationary after d, times of differecing is said to be integrated of order d, 
(or to be I(d)). 
37 This example is taken from Holden and Thompson (1992). 
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